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Three parallel and certainly not independent changes have 
occurred in central bank practices over the past fifteen years. The 
first is the spread of central bank independence, which is tied to the 
notion that even when the government plays a role in setting the 
goals of monetary policy, central banks should be free from political 
interference as they pursue those goals. A second trend is the adoption 
of inflation targeting. Beginning with New Zealand in December 1989, 
and followed by Chile in January 1991, over twenty countries have 
adopted some version of inflation targeting. Finally, the third trend 
among both inflation-targeting and non-targeting central banks is the 
adoption of greater transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. In 
fact, transparency is increasingly viewed as a standard and important 
component of best practices in central banking.
These three trends are closely related. In democratic societies, 
independence needs to be underpinned by accountability. Greater 
transparency is commonly viewed as an important means for 
achieving this accountability. It is also a natural outcome of the 
wide-spread adoption of inflation targeting by central banks in 
both developed and developing economies, since, at a minimum, 
inflation targeting involves the formal announcement of a target 
for the inflation rate. Even central banks that have not formally 
adopted inflation targeting have become more transparent in recent 
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years. Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) provide an index of transparency 
for a set of developed economies that includes both inflation targeters 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) 
and non-targeters (Japan, Switzerland, and the United States). They 
find that between 1998 and 2002, transparency increased for virtually 
all the central banks they studied. Even the Federal Reserve, which 
has so far resisted calls to establish a formal inflation target, has 
moved to make its policy practices more transparent.
Recently, however, new questions have been raised about the 
value of having central banks provide more and better information 
to the public. Morris and Shin (2002) argue that providing more 
accurate public information can carry a cost when private agents 
have individual sources of information and must base decisions partly 
on what they expect others are expecting. In their model, private 
agents must forecast an underlying shock and attempt to forecast the 
forecasts of others. This creates a role for higher-order expectations 
(expectations of expectations of expectations...).1 Agents may then 
overreact to public information, increasing the economy’s sensitivity 
to any forecast errors in the public information.
The possibility that the private sector may overreact to central 
bank announcements captures a concern expressed by policymakers. 
For example, in discussing the release of Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) minutes, Janet Yellen expresses the view that 
“financial markets could misinterpret and overreact to the minutes” 
(Yellen, 2005). Svensson (2006), however, argues that the Morris-Shin 
result is not a general one. He shows that welfare is increased by 
more accurate public information in the Morris-Shin model for all 
but unreasonable parameter values (and he therefore concludes that 
their message supports transparency after all).
Unfortunately, the existing research on the role of higher-order 
expectations and the welfare costs of public information does not 
employ the types of models that are standard in monetary policy 
analysis. In this paper, I employ a simple new Keynesian framework 
to investigate the role of transparency in the presence of private and 
diverse information. The framework can be used to address such 
questions as how the public information provided by interest rate 
movements alters the effectiveness of monetary policy; what benefits 
1. Woodford (2003) also investigates the role of higher-order expectations in 
inducing persistent adjustments to monetary shocks in the Lucas-Phelps islands 
model. See also Hellwig (2002). 
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(and potential costs) are associated with releasing additional public 
information such as a short-run inflation target; whether it is always 
advantageous to announce targets; and whether central banks should 
widely publicize their targets.
My results show that a policy’s impact on inflation is significantly 
affected by the way policy actions alter each individual price setter’s 
expectations about the state of the economy. In the absence of central 
bank announcements, the direct impact on inflation of a contractionary 
policy move can be offset if private information is poor or the central 
bank’s information is very precise. For example, firms may interpret 
an interest rate hike as a signal that the central bank believes the 
economy has been hit by a positive cost shock; inflation may rise as 
firms adjust their own beliefs about the cost shock. Announcements 
allow price setters to distinguish policy actions designed solely to 
offset demand shocks (which therefore should not affect inflation) 
from those actions designed to partially offset the inflation effects 
of cost shocks. Announcements can thereby prevent demand shocks 
from affecting inflation, but expectations can become more volatile in 
reaction to announcements. Inflation variability can increase when 
targets are announced.
If formal announcements heighten inflation variability, it may be 
advantageous for the central bank to make partial announcements 
of the type analyzed by Cornand and Heineman (2004). Partial 
announcements include, for example, speeches about the economy 
that may not be as widely reported as formal policy announcements. 
Speeches and other means of providing partial information play 
an important role in central banking practices, and these means 
of communication long predate the publication of inflation reports. 
The optimal degree of partial announcement depends on the relative 
weight the central bank places on inflation and output gap objectives. 
If the central bank’s information about the aggregate economy is more 
accurate than the private information of price setters, neither inflation 
“nutters” (that is, strict targeters who focus exclusively on stabilizing 
inflation, even to the detriment of economic growth) nor central banks 
that place a large weight on output objectives will find it optimal to 
make any announcements. Central banks that are flexible inflation 
targeters will, however, find it optimal to be completely transparent. 
This may be why inflation targeters (who are not inflation nutters) 
are likely to implement highly transparent policy regimes.
I focus on the role of transparency for a central bank that already 
behaves as an inflation targeter and whose objectives are known and 
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understood by the public. When a central bank has credibly established 
its reputation for maintaining low and stable inflation, the release of 
forecasts, output targets, and other information is a means of providing 
greater transparency about the central bank’s assessment of the state of 
the economy. The next section briefly reviews the related literature; given 
the excellent survey by Geraats (2002), I focus on work that investigates 
issues of public information and transparency. Section 2 then discusses 
the role of the central bank’s instrument as a public signal. I show how the 
behavior of inflation depends on the quality of both the central bank’s and 
the private sector’s information. Section 3 considers the case in which the 
central bank announces its target for the output gap, which provides 
a second source of public information. Partial announcement of the 
central bank’s target are analyzed in section 4. This section also 
considers how announcements affect the optimal policy responses 
to cost and demand disturbances, as well as the optimal degree of 
transparency. Section 5 presents some extensions and explores lessons, 
while the appendix provides details of the model and derivations.
1. POLICY AND PUBLIC INFORMATION
As Issing notes, “Transparency is not an end in itself: a central bank 
is not established with the primary objective of communicating with 
the public” (Issing, 2005). Instead, the arguments in favor of greater 
transparency rest on two pillars—accountability and efficiency. The 
first stresses the importance of transparency for ensuring the public 
can hold policymakers accountable. This rationale for transparency 
resonates strongly among supporters of central bank independence. 
With independence comes accountability, and accountability requires 
transparency.
The second argument for transparency is that it improves economic 
efficiency, in terms of either the operation of financial markets or the 
implementation of policy. For example, in remarks at a 2001 conference 
on transparency in monetary policy held at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis, Alan Greenspan expressed the view that transparency aids 
the functioning of financial markets: “Simply put, financial markets 
work more efficiently when their participants do not have to waste effort 
inferring the stance of monetary policy from diffuse signals generated 
in the day-to-day implementation of policy” (Greenspan, 2002).
Transparency may also improve the ability of monetary policy to 
achieve its goals by ensuring that private market expectations are 
consistent with the aims of central bank policy. In the forward-looking 
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new Keynesian model that is widely used for monetary policy 
analysis, for example, the effectiveness of monetary policy depends 
on the policy’s ability to affect expectations about the future path 
of interest rates (Woodford, 2003). A transparent policy—one that 
reduces uncertainty about future policy actions—can improve the 
trade-off between output and inflation objectives. According to King 
(2005), “Because inflation expectations matter to the behavior of the 
households and firms, the critical aspect of monetary policy is how 
decisions of the central bank affect those expectations.” This focus 
on the public’s expectations is mirrored in the detailed policy reports 
produced by many inflation-targeting central banks. The Central Bank 
of Chile, for example, states that one of the objectives of its Monetary 
Policy Report is “to provide information that can help guide economic 
agents’ expectations regarding future inflation and output trends” 
(Central Bank of Chile, 2005, preface).
Both arguments in favor of transparency have been challenged. 
Critics of formal inflation targeting argue that any regime that holds 
a central bank accountable for a single objective—such as achieving 
an inflation target—may lead the central bank to ignore the effects 
of its actions on broader measures of economic welfare. This is a 
general problem in designing incentive mechanisms; a high powered 
incentive scheme works best when actions can be monitored closely.2 
Furthermore, some analysts argue that transparency may actually 
reduce the central bank’s ability to engage in stabilization policies. 
This last argument is, perhaps, not surprising. Much of the academic 
literature examining transparency uses models in which monetary 
policy has real effects only to the extent that it can surprise the 
public. By creating an inflation surprise, the central bank is able 
to stimulate real output. Since the public cannot be systematically 
surprised under rational expectations, the attempt to engineer 
an economic expansion only leads to an average inflation bias. If 
transparency reduces the central bank’s ability to generate surprises, 
it weakens the central bank’s incentive to engage in expansionary 
policy and, as a result, lowers the equilibrium rate of inflation. 
Transparency would seem to be unambiguously advantageous 
(Faust and Svensson, 2002). However, if the central bank’s scope 
for engaging in stabilization policies is also a function of its ability 
to generate surprise inflation, transparency reduces that ability. 
2. See Walsh (2003) for an application of this principle to inflation targeting. 
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This limits the potential for policy to reduce economic fluctuations. 
Transparency may leave the central bank unable to cushion the 
real economy from macroeconomic shocks, a cost emphasized by 
Cukierman (2001).
Economists now have a great appreciation for the role that 
systematic, predictable policy can have on the real economy. It is 
not just surprises that matter. The effects of transparency may 
differ considerably when the predictability of policy, rather than 
its unpredictability, is important in determining its real impact 
on the economy.3
Morris and Shin (2002) develop a different argument for why 
providing public information can carry a cost. They show that 
the provision of more accurate public information can, in some 
circumstances, have a detrimental effect by leading private agents 
to rely too little on private sources of information.4 Just as the 
earlier literature focuses on the role of monetary surprises rather 
than systematic policy actions to analyze issues of transparency, 
the Morris-Shin analysis is conducted within a framework that 
fails to capture important aspects of actual monetary policy. Thus, 
any potential limits to transparency need to be reexamined in a 
setting that better captures important aspects of monetary policy 
and its implementation. For example, the public information in the 
Morris-Shin study is a signal on an exogenous disturbance. In fact, 
most of the monetary policy debate on transparency focuses on the 
endogenous signals a central bank might release. By announcing its 
inflation forecast, the central bank provides a public signal, but the 
signal is dependent on policy objectives, as well as on the central 
bank’s assessment of economic conditions. That is, how strongly (or 
weakly) the central bank reacts to its estimate of an inflation shock 
affects the information about the central bank’s assessment of the 
economy that can be gleaned from any policy action.
Even in the absence of explicit policy announcements about targets 
or forecasts, central banks that employ a short-term interest rate as 
their policy instrument automatically provide public information, as 
markets can see and react immediately to any change in the policy 
3. The reliance on models in which surprises are the key to the real effects of 
monetary policy may be one reason that Carpenter (2004) finds only a limited set of 
lessons for policymakers to learn from the academic literature on transparency. 
4. As noted previously, Svensson (2006) argues that the Morris-Shin result is not 
a general one, a conclusion supported by Hellwig (2004). 
08.Walsh 227-264.indd 01/03/2007, 18:14 232233 Transparency, Flexibility, and Inflation Targeting 
rate.5 In addition to the direct impact on spending, the interest rate 
setting signals to firms the central bank’s beliefs about the state of 
the economy. A rise in the interest rate may imply that the central 
bank is forecasting a rise in the Wicksellian real rate, or it may 
signal the forecast of a positive cost shock. Thus, the efforts of private 
agents to infer what the central bank knows and what other agents 
think the central bank might know can play a role, even if explicit 
announcements are not made.
Amato and Shin (2003) cast the Morris-Shin analysis in a more 
standard macroeconomic model. In their model, the central bank has 
perfect information about the underlying shocks. This ignores the 
uncertainty that policymakers themselves face in assessing the state 
of the economy. Similarly, Amato and Shin do not allow the private 
sector to use observations on the policy instrument to draw inferences 
about the central bank’s information. In fact, market speculation about 
policy actions often focuses on what a policy change says about the 
central bank’s assessment of the economy; the nominal interest rate 
may be the primary public signal about monetary policy that a central 
bank provides. In this case, the information in the public signal is a 
direct function of the central bank’s policy actions.
Amato and Shin (2003) further assume one-period price setting and 
represent monetary policy by a price-level targeting rule. In Hellwig 
(2004), prices are flexible and policy is given by an exogenous stochastic 
supply of money; private and public information consists of signals 
on the nominal quantity of money. In contrast, I employ a standard 
Calvo-type model of imperfect price flexibility, with the modification 
that firms adjusting each period must do so before observing the actual 
aggregate price level. The need to infer what other firms are doing is 
thus present, as in Amato and Shin and in Hellwig, but the approach 
is consistent with standard new Keynesian models.
Hellwig provides a more microeconomic-based analysis and shows 
that this can be important for assessing the welfare effects of better 
information. My interest is in investigating the role of announcements, 
not just the provision of less noisy exogenous signals. I focus on the 
5. In Faust and Svensson (2002) and Jensen (2002), an exogenous control error 
is present in the link between the central bank’s instrument and the output gap. 
They assume that the central bank is unable to affect or react to this control error, 
but it can provide the public with accurate information on some fraction of the actual 
control error. Transparency is then interpreted as a decrease in the volatility of the 
unannounced component. 
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implications for inflation and output gap volatility, as these are the 
most common measures used to assess macroeconomic performance. 
Some comments on how results might differ if a welfare-based measure 
were used are discussed in the concluding section.
2. THE POLICY INSTRUMENT AS A SOURCE
OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
To study the informational role of policy instruments and 
announcements, I employ a simple new Keynesian model. The details 
of the model are spelled out in the appendix. The model features a 
continuum of firms of measure one, each producing a differentiated 
product using an identical technology. Firms face a Calvo-type fixed 
probability of adjusting their price each period. In the standard new 
Keynesian model, firms have complete and common information about 
current shocks and about current aggregate equilibrium endogenous 
variables when setting prices. I assume instead that firms do not 
observe current shocks or the prices set by other firms until the period 
is over. Since any firm that is setting its price is concerned with its 
price relative to those of other firms, it needs to form expectations 
about the factors that determine its optimal relative price and about 
the behavior of other firms. This need to forecast the behavior of others 
introduces the role for public information stressed by Morris and Shin. 
Each period, private firms and the central bank receive noisy signals 
on aggregate shocks. Each firm’s signal is private information to that 
firm, so individual firms have different information. The central bank 
sets its policy instrument and may make an announcement about its 
output gap target.6 I assume that firms that do adjust their price in 
period t do so after observing the central bank’s instrument.
Suppose firm j is setting its price in period t. Let pj,t* denote the 
log price it chooses. It is convenient to treat Πj,t* ≡ pj,t* – pt–1 as the 
choice variable, where pt–1 is last period’s aggregate log price level. Let 
πt
* be the average of Πj,t* across the firms adjusting in period t, and 
let Πt be the aggregate inflation rate. As shown in the appendix, the 
firm’s decision depends on its expectations regarding πt
*, the output 
gap (denoted xt ), future inflation, and a cost shock (st ). Specifically,
6. In the model, this is equivalent to announcing an inflation target. Give the 
structure of the model, it is somewhat more straightforward to view any announcement 
as an announcement about the output target. 
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where Et
j denotes the expectation at time t based on firm j’s 
information, ω is the fraction of firms that do not adjust their price 
in a given period, and β is a discount factor.7 The parameter κ is the 
output elasticity of marginal cost. The cost shock, st, arises as a result 
of stochastic fluctuations in the wedge between flexible-price output 
and the economy’s efficient level of output (see Benigno and Woodford, 
2004). Since a fraction of all firms (1 – ω) adjusts their prices, while 
the fraction ω does not, aggregate inflation is given by
π ω π t t = − ( ) 1
* .
I represent monetary policy by the central bank’s choice of an 
instrument, xt
I, and by any announcements the central bank might 
make. I assume that xt
I is observed at the start of the period, so that 
any firm that sets its price in period t can condition its choice on xt
I. 
Because the most interesting policy trade-offs are generated by cost 
shocks and not by demand shocks, I model the monetary transmission 
mechanism from the central bank’s instrument to the output gap in 
the simplest way possible. Specifically, let
x x v t t
I
t = + ,                                                                                         (2)
where vt is a demand shock. 
The model includes two primitive shocks: s, representing cost 
factors that generate inefficient inflation fluctuations for a given 
output gap and expectations of future inflation, and v, an aggregate 
demand disturbance. Each is assumed to be serially and mutually 
uncorrelated, and the central bank and price-setting firms must act 
before learning the actual realizations of the shocks. However, each 
firm receives an idiosyncratic private signal about st:
s s j t t j t , , = +φ .
The noise term, φj, is identically and independently distributed 
across firms. These signals are private in the sense that they are 
7. In the case of common information, the appendix shows that equation (1) leads 
to the standard new Keynesian inflation adjustment relation. 
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unobserved by any other agent. The central bank receives private 
signals on the two disturbances:
s s cb t t cb t , , = +φ  and
v v cb t t cb , = +ξ .
The noise terms, φcb and ξcb, are assumed to be independently 
distributed and to be independent of φj for all j and t. All stochastic 
variables are assumed to be normally distributed.8
I consider optimal policy in section 4. For now, I assume the central 
bank sets policy in a manner that would be optimal in the standard 
new Keynesian model if the central bank’s objective is to minimize, 
under discretion, a standard quadratic loss function in inflation and 
the output gap. In this case, the optimal policy insulates xt from 
any predictable demand shocks, while allowing the output gap and 
inflation to fluctuate in response to cost shocks. In particular, the 
central bank sets






t = − α ,                                                                            (3)










t E E s ≡ = + ( ) ∆ 1 ,
where ∆ = (1 – ω)(1 – ωβ)/ω. The parameter α characterizes the manner 
in which the central bank is willing to trade off inflation and output 
gap fluctuations. Thus, α governs the relative volatility of the central 
bank’s targets for the output gap and inflation.
As equation (3) shows, observing the central bank’s instrument 
imperfectly reveals the central bank’s forecasts of demand and cost 
shocks. A rise in xI could reflect the central bank’s belief that a negative 
cost shock has occurred, or it could indicate that a negative demand 
shock has occurred. The actual realization of the output gap is






t = + = + − . 
8. Therefore, if Et
cb denotes the expectations operator based on the central bank’s 
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Price-setting behavior by firm j depends on four factors: the firm’s 
expectations of what other firms are doing (Et
jπt
*); what the firm thinks 
the central bank believes is the current cost shock, since that affects 
the firm’s expectation of the output gap; the firm’s expectation of future 
inflation; and the firm’s expectation of the current cost shock. Thus, 
two new aspects of the decision are present that are missing from 
previous analysis. Not only must the firm form expectations about 
what other firms are expecting (as in Amato and Shin, 2003), but it 
must also form expectations about the central bank’s output gap target, 
which implicitly involves forming expectations about the central bank’s 
expectation of the cost shock (and implicitly, therefore, about what 
other firms are expecting that the central bank is expecting). Because 
firm j has private information on the cost shock, its expectation of s 




jst. The problem is to guess what the central bank 
thinks, not simply to guess what the cost shock is. Moreover, the firm 
must be forward-looking in assessing future inflation.9
When the public can observe the central bank’s instrument, 
but no announcements are made by the central bank, the relevant 
information set of firm j consists of its private signal, sj,t, and the 
central bank’s instrument setting, xt
I. Given that the firm must assess 
the likely value of the output gap (since that is related to real marginal 
cost), observing xt
I provides a noisy signal on xt
T and therefore on xt. 
It also provides information relevant for forecasting the cost shock 
itself. The informational content of this signal depends on the policy 
parameter α. This contrasts with Amato and Shin (2003) and Hellwig 
(2004), who model the public signal as exogenous. Here, the setting 
of the policy instrument is the public signal, and it depends on the 
policymaker’s preferences.
Firm j’s expectations of st and xt conditional on sj,t and xt
I can be 
written as Et
jst = Γ11sj,t + Γ12 xt
I and Et
jxt = Γ21sj,t + Γ22 xt
I. In Morris and 
Shin, Amato and Shin, and Hellwig, the weights placed on private and 
public information in the individual firm’s forecast are independent of 
any aspect of the central bank’s policy decisions. This is not the case 
here, as the public signal is the central bank’s instrument; Γi,j generally 
depends on α. For example, if α is very small, then movements in 
xt
I are due primarily to the central bank’s attempt to offset demand 
9. The presence of a signaling effect of policy will alter the central bank’s incentives 
in setting policy; see Geraats (2002). In this and the next section, I ignore this by simply 
taking equation (3) as the description of policy. Section 4 considers optimal policy. 
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shocks. Private firms therefore place little weight on xt
I in forming 
their expectations about the cost shock.
An equilibrium strategy for firm j is a linear function of its 
private signal and the policy instrument. This strategy is derived in 
the appendix. Aggregating over all adjusting firms and multiplying 
by 1 – ω to obtain the aggregate inflation rate, equilibrium inflation 
can be written as
π ω π γ γ t t t t
I s x = − ( ) = + 1 1 2
* .                                                                (4)










= − ( )
− ( ) + ( )
























1 12 1 1 1 1 1
=
− ( ) − ( )
+
− ( ) − ( )
+
− ( ) Γ Γ Γ .            (5)
Equation (5) divides γ2, the impact of the policy instrument on 
inflation, into three distinct terms, each of which represents a different 
channel through which the policy instrument affects inflation. The 
first term is the direct (and standard) effect of the instrument on the 
expected output gap and, therefore, on inflation. Because firms must 
set prices before they know the current level of production, it is the 
expected output gap that affects inflation.10 A unit increase in xt
I 
causes firms to expect a rise in the output gap of Γ22, and the output 
gap elasticity of inflation is (1 – ω)(1 – ωβ)κ/ω. The second term arises 
when a change in the central bank’s instrument leads firms to alter 
their own expectations of the cost shock. A rise in the instrument will 
be interpreted (partially) as indicating a negative cost shock (Γ12 ≤ 0 
because α ≤ 0). This tends to reduce inflation, partially offsetting the 
direct positive impact that a rise in xtI has on inflation. Finally, the 
third term captures the Morris-Shin effect. The public nature of the 
instrument causes the firm to alter not only its assessment of the cost 
shock, but also its expectations of what other firms expect.
10. In the absence of demand shocks, xt
I = xt and Γ22 = 1, so that γ2 = (1 – ω)(1 – ωβ)κ/ω. 
One thus obtains the standard result in the literature that the output gap elasticity of 
inflation is (1 – ω)(1 – ωβ)κ/ω. 
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To assess the components of γ2 and how they vary with the 
quality of private and public information, I numerically solve the 
model. To do so, I set ω = 0.5, κ = 2.0, and β = 0.99. A value of 0.5 for 
ω is consistent with evidence on the frequency of price adjustment in 
the United States (Bils and Klenow, 2004). In microeconomic-founded 
models, κ is the sum of the coefficient of relative risk aversion and 
the inverse of the wage elasticity of labor supply. Values of one for 
each of these parameters are not uncommon, yielding κ = 2.0. The 
value chosen for the discount factor, β, is typical when dealing with 
quarterly data. In the standard common-information case, optimal 
policy under discretion would imply that α = –(κ∆)2/[(κ∆)2 + λ], so 
I use this value for α. For the variances of the different stochastic 
shocks, I set the variances of the cost and demand shocks equal 
to each other and normalize so that σ σ s v
2 2 1 = = . Following Amato 
and Shin, I assume for the benchmark case that the private sector 
noise variance is equal to 0.2. While Amato and Shin assume the 
central bank has perfect information on the shocks, I assume the 
noise variances in the central bank’s signals also equal 0.2, so for the 
baseline case, σ σ σ φ φ ξ , , . j cb
2 2 2 0 2 = = = .
Figure 1 illustrates how the quality of the private sector’s information 
affects the net impact of the policy instrument on inflation. The curve 
labeled “total effect” gives the effect of a one-unit increase in the policy 
instrument on inflation as a function of the variance of the noise in the 
private signal on the cost shock. A rise in xt
I that reflects a rise in xt
T is 
associated with an increase in the output gap and would be expected to 
increase inflation. When σφ,j
2 = 0, firms are able to observe the cost shock 
without error; observing the central bank’s instrument setting conveys 
no further information about st. In this case, policy operates on inflation 
only through the standard direct effect on the output gap. As the quality 
of private information deteriorates, however, firms increasingly use 
xt
I in forming expectations about the cost shock. The line labeled “firm 
signal effect” shows the impact on inflation when firm’s alter their 
own expectations about the cost shock once they observe xt
I (operating 
through the second term in equation (5)). Recall that xt
I is decreasing in 
the central bank’s signal on the cost shock. Firms interpret an increase 
in xt
I as partly reflecting a decrease in the central bank’s forecast of 
the cost shock. Firms, lower prices in anticipation of a negative cost 
shock. The direct output gap effect becomes larger for a parallel reason: 
changes in xt
I generate larger changes in firms’ expectations of the cost 
shock and, therefore, of the expected output gap.11 
11. The firm signal effect and the output gap effect essentially cancel each other, 
because κα ≈ –1 in the simulations. 
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Figure 1. The Quality of Private Sector Information and the 
Policy Instrument’s Impact on Inflationa
Source: Author’s computations.
a. The impact on inflation of a change in the central bank’s policy instrument declines as the quality of the private 
sector’s information falls.
The line in the figure labeled “aggregate signal effect” is the 
contribution of the Morris-Shin effect—the channel working through 
the firm’s expectations of other firms’ expectations. Consistent with 
Svensson’s finding in the original Morris-Shin model, this effect 
contributes little to the overall impact on inflation of a change in the 
central bank’s instrument.
By expressing xt
I in terms of the underlying shocks, one can express 
aggregate inflation as






t t s v = + ( ) + − + ( ) 1 2 2 2 , ,                                (6)
and the output gap as
x s v t s
cb




t = + ( )− − ( ) − αθ φ θ θ ξ , 1 .                                              (7)
If the central bank has complete information on the demand 
shock, so that ξt ≡ 0 and θvcb = 1, the output gap is insulated from 
the demand shock. Nevertheless, demand shocks do affect inflation, 
because equation (6) contains the term – γ2vt, arising from the effects 
of demand shocks on the central bank’s instrument. If the central bank 
observes a positive vt, it lowers xt
I. Private firms interpret this fall in 
the policy instrument as reflecting the central bank’s belief that the 
economy has experienced a positive cost shock. Individual firms that 
are adjusting their price then increase their estimate of the cost shock 
and believe that other firms will do the same. Lack of transparency 
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about the central bank’s estimate of demand shocks causes inflation 
to fluctuate in response to demand shocks, even though the central 
bank has prevented these shocks from affecting the output gap.
In the literature building on Morris and Shin, the precision of 
the central bank’s announcements is often treated as a policy choice. 
While xt
I is not an announcement but rather a policy action observed 
by all firms, its informational content is affected by the precision 
of the signals received by the central bank. Before examining the 
role of announcements, I explore the effects on output and inflation 
variability of more precise central bank information, in the form of a 
decline in the variance in the central bank’s signal on either the cost 
shock or the demand shock. Morris and Shin argue that an increase 
in the precision of the public signal could lower welfare, essentially by 
making the economy more sensitive to public forecast errors. Amato 
and Shin (2003) find that the variance of the price level increases as 
the public signal becomes more accurate.
Figure 2 plots the variances of annualized inflation and the output 
gap as functions of the quality of the central bank’s signal on the cost 
shock. Amato and Shin’s result does not hold when the public signal 
is the central bank’s instrument and the central bank’s forecast of 
the cost shock becomes more accurate. As  σφ,cb
2 falls, so too does the 
variance of inflation. Because the central bank’s forecast errors affect 
inflation, an improvement in the central bank’s ability to forecast leads 
Figure 2. The Accuracy of the Central Bank’s Forecast and 
the Volatility of Inflation and the Output Gapa 
Source: Author’s computations.
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to more stable inflation. Inflation is also more stable if private sector 
information is less accurate (higher σφ,j
2 ). When the quality of private 
information is low, private sector expectations—and thus the prices 
firms set—are less sensitive to private information. The volatility of 
the output gap does increase somewhat as σφ,cb
2 falls. When the central 
bank can forecast more accurately, it responds more aggressively to its 
signal on the cost shock, leading to greater output gap movements.
Standard quadratic loss functions used to represent the objectives 
of monetary policy typically include both inflation and output gap 
volatility. Because more accurate central bank information makes 
the output gap more volatile while reducing the volatility of inflation, 
the net gain from the perspective of the central bank depends on the 
relative weight placed on these two objectives. Figure 2 suggests that 
only a central bank that placed little weight on its inflation objective 
would want less accurate forecasts.
3. CENTRAL BANK ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT ITS TARGETS
While the impact of policy can depend on the informational 
content of the policy action, discussions of transparency generally 
focus on actions by the central bank that are designed explicitly 
to provide information. For example, the publication of the central 
bank’s inflation or output forecasts or its announcement of short-run 
targets for inflation increase transparency. As noted earlier, a key 
objective of policymakers is to influence private sector expectations. 
The market, however, uses central bank announcements for two 
purposes. Private agents use announcements to better understand 
and forecast the intentions of the central bank, and they also try to 
infer from any announcement something about the central bank’s 
assessment of the state of the economy. This means that errors in the 
central bank’s assessment of the economy will infect private sector 
forecasts and expectations. This may introduce undesirable volatility 
into private sector expectations.
Suppose the central bank announces its target for the output gap.12 
Since the central bank’s target for the output gap depends solely on its 
forecast of the cost shock, the announcement of xT reveals Et
cbst, and 
firms no longer need to infer the central bank’s cost shock forecast from 
its instrument setting. The announcement of xt
T does affect each firm’s 
12. As noted previously, this is equivalent to announcing an inflation target. 
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estimate of the cost shock itself, and it therefore also affects individual 
firm’s beliefs about the actions that other firms will undertake. Firms 
can also use the observation of xI and the announcement of xT to infer 
the central bank’s forecast of the demand disturbance.13 However, this 
information is not relevant for their pricing decision (in the present 
model), since private forecasts of the output gap simply equal xt
T.14
Intuitively, one would expect that announcing the target would 
improve economic outcomes. Since private firms are now able 
to distinguish between interest rate movements that are simply 
designed to offset demand disturbances from those reflecting the 
central bank’s estimate of the cost shock, demand shocks will no 
longer cause fluctuations in the inflation rate. At the same time, 
releasing information on xt
T in no way hampers the central bank’s 
ability to achieve its output gap target. Greater transparency should 
thus improve welfare.
This intuition, however, is not necessarily correct, for reasons 
similar to those discussed by Morris and Shin. While greater 
transparency about the central bank’s output gap target ensures that 
instrument changes designed to offset demand shocks no longer lead 
to fluctuations in inflation expectations, private sector expectations 
become more sensitive to the announced target than they were to 
the instrument. Consequently, the central bank’s forecast errors in 
estimating the cost shock generate greater volatility in the inflation 
rate than they did prior to the introduction of announcements. If this 
channel dominates the reduction in volatility that occurs because 
demand shocks no longer affect inflation, loss can actually rise when 
targets are announced. Whether transparency reduces or increases 
loss depends on the quantitative characteristics of the economy.
When all firms observe xt
T, equation (1) becomes (again, assuming 
serially uncorrelated shocks)






t E x E s ,
* * = − ( ) + − ( ) + ( ) 1 1 .
In this case, firm j no longer needs to infer the central bank’s 
estimate of the cost shock. Instead, it must only assess what it 
13. Recall that xt
T – xt
I = Et
cbvt. The information structure here differs from that 
employed in Geraats (2005), who studies a model in which the public is uncertain about 
the central bank’s inflation target, as well as the underlying demand and supply shocks. 
Simply announcing an output gap target was not sufficient, in her model, to reveal the 
central bank’s information about the underlying shocks. 
14. This follows because Et
jxt = Et
j(xt
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believes the cost shock is and what it expects other adjusting firms 
will do. The announcement of the target output gap, which reveals the 
central bank’s estimate of the cost shock, also provides information 
that the firm may wish to combine with its private signal in forming 
an estimate of st.
Let πt
A denote the equilibrium inflation rate when xt
T is announced. 
The appendix shows that








cb t s x s = + = + ( ) + 1 2 1 2 2 , .                                  (8)
The output gap is given by










cb t = + − = + ( )+ − ( ) − αθ φ θ θ ξ , , 1 .                 (9)
Comparing these with equations (6) and (7) reveals that the behavior 
of the output gap is unaffected by the central bank’s announcement. 
The announcement has no effect on the central bank’s information 
set and therefore does not affect either the instrument choice or the 
behavior of the output gap. This follows from the assumption that the 
central bank directly controls the gap (up to a forecast error). Hence, 
the more interesting comparison is between equations (6) and (8).
Inflation is insulated from demand shocks when the central bank 
announces its output target. This does not necessarily mean, however, 
that inflation will be more stable. Because the information provided by 
the central bank is no longer contaminated by demand shocks, public 
expectations about the cost shock will respond more strongly to the 
announced value of xt
T. As a consequence,  γ γ 2 2 > , so that inflation 
is affected more by any errors the central bank makes in forecasting 
the cost shock; the coefficient on φcb,t is larger in absolute value in 
equation (8), the equilibrium expression for inflation with a target 
announcement, than it is in equation (6), the equilibrium inflation 
rate without announcements. 
Table 1 shows the percent change in the variance of inflation that 
results from announcing the output gap target as a function of the 
noise variances in both the private and central bank signals on the 
cost shock. When private information is very accurate (σφ,j
2 = 0.1), 
announcements cause inflation to become more variable unless the 
central bank’s information is equally accurate. With private sector 
information quite precise, the central bank’s instrument contains little 
useful information in the absence of the announcement of an output 
gap target, so γ2 is very small. The central bank’s forecast errors thus 
have little impact on inflation. When the target is announced, however, 
more weight is assigned to it, since it now provides direct information 
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on the central bank’s forecast of st. If central bank forecast errors have 
a large variance, inflation volatility increases.
Table 1. Effect of announcing xt
T




2 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0
0.1 –18.08 25.32 32.41 30.87 28.55
0.3 –40.95 –30.42 –17.07 –7.41 –4.23
0.5 –26.49 –41.50 –31.65 –21.48 –17.26
0.8  7.08 –41.47 –38.17 –29.98 –25.79
1.0  32.27 –37.06 –38.47 –32.18 –28.34
Source: Author’s computations.
The other situation in which announcements can raise inflation 
variability occurs when the central bank has relatively precise 
forecasts of the cost shock, while private information is very noisy. 
When private information is poor, price-setting firms place a very 
large weight on the central bank’s announcement, particularly if the 
central bank has accurate information. Even though σφ,cb
2 is small, the 
announcement has such a large weight on private expectations that 
inflation becomes more volatile.
4. PARTIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS
In the previous section, I assumed that everyone receives (and 
uses) the central bank’s announcement about its output gap target. 
As noted in the introduction, however, central banks often release 
information through speeches and other public venues that reach a 
selective, rather than a universal, audience. Financial markets closely 
follow and monitor central bank announcements, but this is unlikely to 
be the case for the wider public audience. Central banks renowned for 
their transparency, such as the Bank of England, the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand, or the Swedish Rijksbank, produce glossy publications 
that explain their policy framework and forecasts in great detail, yet 
the readership of these materials is unlikely to extend very far. Even 
though mass newspapers report on central bank policies and forecasts, 
I suspect that only the broad contours of policy reach the proverbial 
person on the street. 
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Using a framework similar to the Morris-Shin model, Cornand and 
Heinemann (2004) demonstrate that the partial release of information 
can be useful. The basic intuition for Cornand and Heinemann’s result 
is straightforward. The wide release of public information serves to 
coordinate expectations, and this can make the economy sensitive to 
noise in the public information; this is the cost of announcements. The 
gain is that announcements provide information that helps the public 
form more accurate expectations. When the general announcement 
of the central bank’s information may be costly, it may still pay to 
release information to some members of the public. If only a few agents 
receive the central bank’s information, private sector expectations 
will, on average, be more accurate. Since only a few agents receive 
the information, however, it has little effect on the typical agent’s 
expectations of what others are expecting.
To consider the partial release of information, suppose the central 
bank announces xt
T in a manner such that only a fraction, P, of all 
firms receive the information.15 As P → 1, and all firms learn xt
T, the 
effects of expected demand shocks on inflation are eliminated, but 
inflation becomes more responsive to φcb,t. This may limit how widely 
the central bank wants to broadcast an announcement of xT. 
This creates three classes of firms in each period: those that do 
not receive an opportunity to adjust their price, those that do adjust 
but do not receive the central bank’s announcement, and those that 
adjust and receive the announcements. Consider first the adjusting 
firms that receive information about xt
T, corresponding to P. For 
these firms, their expectation of the current cost shock depends on 
their private information, sj,t, and on the announced target output 
gap.16 For the adjusting firms that do not observe xt
T (corresponding 
to 1 – P ), expectations can be based only on private signals and the 
central bank’s instrument. These firms must also forecast the central 
bank’s output gap target. Firms that adjust prices in period t must 
form expectations about what other firms are expecting, and this now 
15. This partial release of information can be interpreted in terms of the notion of 
rational inattention emphasized by Mankiw and Reis (2002): perhaps all firms observe 
the announcement, but only a fraction, P, actually incorporate the new information 
into their decisions. The assumption here is not that the central bank selectively 
provides information to some firms but not others; all firms have an equal probability 
of obtaining the information. 
16. Given the assumptions about policy, the instrument xt
I provides no relevant 
information once xt




no information about vt – Et
cbvt. The equilibrium strategy of a firm that observes xt
T 
depends on xt
I, since the firm’s expectations about what other firms expect must take 
into account the behavior of firms that do not observe xt
T. 
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depends on the fraction of firms that receive information about the 
central bank’s output gap target. The resulting equilibrium inflation 
rate with partial announcements, πt
P, takes the form
π µ µ µ t
P
s t I t
I
T t
T P s P x P x = ( ) + ( ) + ( ) ,
where the coefficients µj depend on P. These coefficients also depend 
on the policy rule followed by the central bank.
At this point, it is useful to assume a loss function that allows one 
to assess the effects of partial announcements and to derive optimal 
policy. I assume the central bank’s objective is to minimize a standard 
quadratic loss function that depends on inflation variability and output 
gap variability.17 Specifically, let loss be given by
L x = + σ λσ π
2 2 ,                                                                                     (10)
where σi
2 denotes the variance of i. For the benchmark simulations, I 
set λ = 1 when the inflation rate is expressed at an annual rate.
The solid line in figure 3 shows loss as a function of P for the 
benchmark policy rule of equation (3). Loss is lower when P = 1 
(complete announcements) than when P = 0 (no announcement), but 
not fully announcing the output target still generates a small gain. 
For this policy rule, the minimum loss occurs when P = 0.9.
Figure 3. Loss as a Function of P for Different Policy Rules 
Source: Author’s computations.
a. Loss is relative to the optimal policy with P = 0.
17. In section 5 I discuss how conclusions might be affected by using a loss function 
that is directly related to the welfare costs of fluctuations in the model. Hellwig (2004) 
provides a welfare-based analysis of the accuracy of public information. 
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While a policy rule of the form assumed in equation (3) is optimal in 
a standard new Keynesian model of monetary policy (under discretion), 
the standard framework assumes symmetric information on the part of 
firms and the central bank. The central bank’s policy instrument thus 
plays no role in affecting expectations. When the policy instrument 
also conveys information about the central bank’s assessment of the 
state of the economy, the central bank’s incentives are altered. The 
central bank must now take into account the informational impact 
its policy choice has on private sector behavior. This incentive effect 
of information can distort policy. In the context of the model of the 
previous section, for example, the central bank may not fully adjust 
its instrument to offset demand shocks, since the movements in 
xI necessary to do so would cause the private sector to alter their 
expectations about the cost shock. Greater transparency in the form of 
an explicit announcement about the central bank’s output gap target 
would allow the central bank to fully offset demand shocks without 
affecting private sector expectations about the cost shock. Greater 
transparency thus improves policy flexibility.18
The desirability of announcements depends critically on the policy 
rule followed by the central bank. For example, suppose the central 
bank implements a policy rule of the form









cb = + α α 1 2 .                                                                  (11)
This rule allows the central bank to let demand shocks affect 
the output gap target if α2 ≠ –1. Suppose further that it chooses 
α1 and α2 to be optimal in the absence of announcements (that 
is, when P = 0).19 Loss as a function of P with this policy rule is 
shown by the line labeled “policy optimal for P = 0.” In this case, loss 
is lower when no announcements are made than it is with a complete 
announcement. The optimal P for this rule is 0.42; that is, the output 
gap target should be conveyed to less than half the private sector. 
Failure to adjust policy when announcements are made can lead to 
significant deterioration in loss, as illustrated by the large increase 
in loss for P = 1 when the policy that was optimal in the absence of 
announcements continues to be followed (see the dashed line). The 
18. Walsh (1999) and Geraats (2005), among others, explore the incentive effect of 
announcements in different monetary policy contexts. See Geraats (2002) for further 
references. 
19. For the benchmark parameter values, this involves α1 = –0.5221 and 
α2 = –0.9726. 
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line labeled “optimal policy” shows the relation between the extent of 
announcements and loss when policy adjusts to be optimal for each P. 
The lowest loss is now achieved with P = 0.6; the announcement of the 
output gap target should be made to reach most but not all firms.
Figure 4 shows how the policy coefficients vary with the extent of 
the announcement. The horizontal solid line in each panel shows the 
value of the coefficient for the standard optimal discretionary policy. 
The top panel shows that the central bank should react more strongly 
to a cost shock (α1 is larger in absolute value) when the bank is less 
transparent (when P is smaller). The lower panel, in turn, shows that 
demand shocks should be fully offset in the standard case (α2 = –1). 
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In contrast, the central bank’s optimal response to its estimate of the 
demand shock is muted when P < 1. This reflects the incentive effect 
that arises when the central bank is not fully transparent (Geraats, 
2002). This is easiest to understand when P = 0. Private agents observe 
only the policy instrument in this case, and they attempt to infer the 
central bank’s cost shock estimate from the instrument. Reacting more 
strongly to demand shocks adds more noise to the signal provided 
to the private sector. Errors in the central bank’s demand forecast 
influence inflation, and this also leads to a more muted response to 
Et
cbvt. As P → 1, the central bank can adjust its policy instrument to 
fully offset demand shocks, since private agents are able to distinguish 
between movements in the instrument stemming from cost shocks 
and those stemming from demand shocks.
The discussion so far has held λ, the relative weight on the output 
gap objective in the loss function, fixed. A standard exercise is to vary 
this weight to map out an efficiency frontier that identifies the minimum 
inflation variance associated with a given output gap variance. By 
comparing this frontier for P = 0 and for P = 1, one can assess the 
effects of announcing the output gap target on the trade-off faced by the 
central bank. One can also examine how the frontier for the optimal P 
compares to the trade-offs for P = 0 and P = 1 for each λ. 
Figure 5 shows the optimal P as a function of λ for the benchmark 
parameters.20 Complete transparency (P = 1) is only optimal for central 
banks that place a large weight on output gap volatility relative to 
inflation volatility. With P = 1, the central bank can set α2 = –1; that is, 
it will completely insulate the output gap from any forecasted demand 
shock. The gain from setting α2 = –1 is larger for central banks that place 
a correspondingly large weight on stabilizing the output gap. However, if λ 
is small, so that the central bank cares primarily about inflation stability, 
then the optimal P is less than one. By setting P < 1, the central bank 
ensures that private firms do not overreact to its instrument or to the 
announcement. It will be optimal, in this case, not to fully offset demand 
shocks, but the resulting increase in output gap volatility leads to only 
a small impact on the loss function when λ is small.
For the benchmark value of σφ,j
2 , the critical value of λ at which 
it becomes optimal to fully announce targets decreases as the quality 
of the central bank’s information about the cost shock rises. With 
more accurate information on the cost shock, the central bank is 
less concerned that its forecast errors will create excessive inflation 
20. The values of λ are based on inflation being expressed at annual rates. 
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volatility. As suggested by table 1, however, if private information is 
very poor, announcements can increase inflation volatility and the 
optimal P will fall.
As discussed earlier, the benchmark calibration, in which the 
firm’s private information and the central bank’s information 
about the aggregate cost shock are equally noisy, may overstate the 
accuracy of the private information that an individual firm is likely 
to have about aggregate conditions. Figure 6 shows the effects of 
Figure 6. The Optimal Extent of Announcements as a 
Function of λ: σ σ φ φ , , . , . j cb
2 2 0 4 0 1 = =
Source: Author’s computations.
Figure 5. The Optimal Extent of Announcements as a 
Function of λ: σ σ φ φ , , . j cb
2 2 0 2 = =  
Source: Author’s computations.
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instead assuming σφ,j
2 = 0.4 and σφ,cb
2 = 0.1. When the central bank has 
relatively more accurate information about any aggregate cost shock, 
then it is optimal to widely announce the output gap target as long as 
some weight (but not a large weight) is placed on output gap volatility 
in the loss function. The figure offers an interesting perspective on 
the rise of central bank transparency. If inflation-targeting central 
banks are viewed as focusing primarily on inflation objectives while 
still caring about output fluctuations, such that λ is small but still 
positive, they are most likely to find a policy of complete transparency 
to be optimal.
5. LESSONS AND EXTENSIONS
In this paper, I have investigated the role of transparency when 
private information is diverse and the central bank provides public 
information either implicitly, by setting its policy instrument, or 
explicitly, by making announcements about its short-run targets. In the 
absence of explicit announcements, the impact the policy instrument 
has on inflation depends critically on the information the instrument 
conveys to the public about the state of the economy. By announcing 
its short-run output gap target (equivalently, its short-run inflation 
target), the central bank reveals information on its forecast of demand 
and cost shocks. This provides more accurate public information to 
price-setting firms, but it also makes private sector decisions more 
sensitive to the central bank’s forecast errors. As a result, inflation 
may become more volatile when the central bank announces its 
short-run target. For most combinations of the relative accuracy 
of private and central bank information, however, the net result of 
making announcements is to reduce inflation variability. When no 
announcement is made, the central bank will not fully neutralize the 
impact of demand shocks on the output gap and inflation. The signaling 
effect of policy actions constrains the central bank’s response to its 
forecasts of demand shocks. By making announcements, the central 
bank can respond more flexibly and stabilize the output gap from 
demand disturbances.
Being transparent is seldom an all-or-nothing proposition. Partial 
announcements provide one means of investigating how widely central 
banks should disseminate information about their targets. If central 
banks have more accurate information about aggregate disturbances 
than private firms do (that is,  σ σ φ φ , , j cb
2 2 > ), then inflation targeters 
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should be very transparent (that is, P = 1). Only inflation nutters or 
central banks that place a large weight on output gap stability would 
find it optimal to make no announcements.
By assuming serially uncorrelated shocks, I was able to ignore 
the role of expectations about future inflation, considering only the 
case in which the private sector observes the central bank’s current 
instrument setting, while some (or all) private firms may observe 
the current output gap target. The basic framework, however, can 
be used to consider the implications of announcements about future 
instrument values or targets. First, consider a situation in which the 
central bank announces its expected future output gap target.21 If 
disturbances are serially uncorrelated, expected future targets and 
instruments would all equal zero, and their announcement would 
convey no further information to the public. Assume then that cost 
and demand shocks do display some degree of persistence. Unless the 
central bank has additional information that would help it forecast 
future innovations, the announcements of the future target conveys 
no additional information, once the current target is announced.
The Federal Reserve has, in recent years, phrased its press releases 
after FOMC meetings to give markets a strong signal about the likely 
future direction of interest rates. In terms of the present model, this 
can be interpreted as providing information about xI
t+1 + 1. Suppose 
the central bank announces its expected future instrument setting. 
In this case, the public obtains information on 









cb = + α θ α θ 1 2 and 












+ + + = + 1 1 1 2 1 α α .
As long as cost and demand disturbances are characterized by 
differing degrees of serial correlation, the private sector is able to 
infer both central bank signals, st
cb and vt
cb, from the announced 
information. Announcing the future path of the policy instrument 
thus represent an alternative to announcing the policy targets. 
An important future extension of the analysis will be to examine 
the case of unobservable state variables. The estimation problem facing 
both the private sector and the central bank is greatly complicated 
when shocks are serially correlated and unobserved. Svensson and 
21. This is equivalent in the present model to announcing a future inflation target.  
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Woodford (2004) consider the case of optimal policy with unobserved 
states and asymmetric information between the private sector and 
the central bank. As in the standard literature, however, they assume 
that all private sector information is common information, and they 
further assume that the private sector has full information about 
aggregate states. 
While some of the effects of transparency could be assessed by 
examining the implications for inflation volatility, a loss function was 
required to determine the optimal extent to which information should 
be made public. I employed a standard quadratic loss function. This 
can be misleading, as Hellwig (2004) demonstrates, and it tends to 
undervalue the gains from transparency. The reason is based on the 
underlying distortion that makes inflation costly in new Keynesian 
models. The welfare costs of inflation are due to the increase in price 
dispersion across firms that inflation generates. When firms have 
private information, this introduces a new source of price dispersion 
and exacerbates the welfare costs of inflation. The central bank can 
reduce the extent of price dispersion by providing information that 
is common to all firms. This represents a welfare gain and increases 
the advantages of adopting a transparent policy regime. In terms of 
the model of partial announcements, employing an explicit welfare 
criterion is likely to increase the optimal degree of transparency.
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APPENDIX
This appendix provides details of the model underlying the 
discussion in the text The probability that a firm does not have the 
opportunity to adjust its price is ω. The log price of firm i in period t 
is pi,t, and pt is the aggregate log price level. Denote by pi,t* the price 
chosen by firm i if it adjusts its price in period t. Then, 
p p p t t t = − ( ) + − 1 1 ω ω
* ,                                                                       (12)





. Equation (12) implies that p p p p t t t t





t t t t t t t p p p p p p = − = − ( ) − ( )=
− 

   


    − ( ) − − 1 1 1
1 * * .                       (13)
Let ϕ denote real marginal cost, and assume a steady-state 
inflation rate of zero. If firm j can adjust its price in the period, it 
sets its current price equal to the expected discounted value of current 
and future nominal marginal cost, ϕ + p. Future marginal cost is 
discounted by the probability that the firm has not received another 
opportunity to adjust ω and by the discount factor, β. In addition, I 
assume price is affected by a mean zero aggregate cost shock, st, that 
alters the firm’s desired price. Hence,










* = − ( ) ( ) + + ( )
=
∞
+ + + ∑ 1
0
ωβ ωβ ϕ .                              (14)
where Et
j denotes the expectations based on the information available 
to firm j. The key assumption in equation (14) is that prior to setting 
its price, the firm does not observe the aggregate price level or the 
realization of either the current marginal cost or the cost shock.
Individual firms may set different prices because they base 
their expectations on different information sets. To simplify, I 
assume that all information is revealed at the end of each period. 
This implies that 






+ + = 1 1 .
Each firm expects that if it can adjust in t + 1, it will set the same 
price as other adjusting firms.
Using equation (13) and defining πj,t* = pj,t* – pt–1 one obtains, 
after some manipulation, 
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t E E E s ,




   


   1 1 1
1   + Et
j
t π 1 ,      (15)
where  πt t t p p
* * = − −1 . Hence, firm j adjusts its price based on its 
expectations of what other adjusting firms are choosing (Et
j
t π
* ), its 
expectations about current marginal costs and the cost shock, and 
its forecast of next-period aggregate inflation. Assume real marginal 
cost is linearly related to an output gap measure, xt: ϕt = κxt. Then, 









t E E x E s ,




   


  1 1 1
1    + Et
j
t π 1.     (16)
It is interesting to contrast this equation with the standard case in 
which all firms have identical information sets and are able to observe 
the current disturbances. In the standard Calvo model, π π j t t ,
* * = for all j, 













   


    +
− 

   











    + Et t π 1 .




κ β π t t t t t t x s E = − ( ) =














which differs from the standard from only in the coefficient on the cost 
shock. This is due to the fact that I include the shock in the equation 
for the firm’s optimal price (equation 14), rather than just adding it 
on at the end.
No Announcements
In the absence of announcements, the information available to 
firm j is derived from its private signal, sj,t, and from observing the 
policy instrument, xt
I. These are related to the cost shock innovation 




































, , φ .
Let Γ = VouVoo
–1, where Vou is the covariance matrix between the 
observed signals [sj,t, xt
I ] and the unobserved variables [st, xt] and 
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Voo is the covariance matrix of the observed signals. Then, firm j’s 






























Let Γi,j denote the i,j th element of Γ. Then Et




T = Γ21sj,t + Γ22xt
I. Generally, Γi,j depends on the policy parameter, 
α (see equation (3)).
Firm j’s price setting is now given by 













= − ( ) + − ( ) + ( )






Γ Γ 2 2xt
I ( ),
                                    (17)
where the assumption of serially uncorrelated shocks has been used to 
set Et
jπt+1 = 0. An equilibrium strategy for firm j will take the form 
π γ γ j t j t t
I s x ,
*
, = +   1 2 .                                                                             (18)
In forming expectations about the pricing behavior of other firms 
adjusting in the current period, firm j’s expectation of πt
* is given by







I π γ γ γ γ γ
*
, , = + = + + ( )      1 2 1 11 1 12 2 Γ Γ . 
Substituting this into equation (17) yields
π ω γ ωβ κ
ω γ
j t j t s ,
*
, = − ( ) + − ( ) + ( ) 
 

+ − ( ) +
1 1
1





Γ γ γ ωβ κ 2 12 22 1 ( )+ − ( ) + ( ) 
 
 Γ Γ xt
I.
When I equate coefficients in this expression to those in equation 










− ( ) + ( )







ω γ ωβ κ
ω
2
1 12 12 22 1 1
=
− ( ) − ( ) + ( ) Γ Γ Γ
.                                               (19)
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Aggregating over all adjusting firms yields equation (4) of the text: 
π ω π γ γ t t t t
I s x = − ( ) = + 1 1 2
* , 
where γ ω γ 1 1 1 = − ( ) and  γ ω γ 2 2 1 = − ( ) . 
Announcements
















 = + Γ Γ 1 2 ,
where  Γ =
− V V ou oo
1, in which  Voois the covariance matrix of the 
observed signals [sj,t, xt
T], and  is the covariance matrix between the 
observed and unobserved signals, st and xt. 
The equilibrium is derived following the same steps as in the 
previous section. Let Γi j , denote the jth element of Γi . Then equilibrium 
inflation is 
π γ γ t
A
j t t











− ( ) + ( )







ω γ ωβ κ
ω
2
1 12 12 1 1
=
− ( ) − ( ) + ( ) Γ Γ
.
Partial Announcements
This subsection provides the solution in the general case of partial 
announcements and a policy that reacts to both cost and demand 
shocks. Specifically, assume






t = + α α 1 2 , 
so that 






t = + + ( ) α α 1 2 1 . 
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In the previous sections, α2 = –1, so that the target gap was independent 
of the central bank’s expected demand disturbance. 
Consider first those adjusting firms that receive information about 
xt
T (or πt
T). There are a fraction, P, of such firms; let j index such firms. 
For these firms, Et
jst = H1sj,t + H2xt
T and Et
jxt = xt
T. The pricing decision 
of such a firm satisfies 





T E x H s H x ,
* *
, = − ( ) + − ( ) + − ( ) + ( ) 1 1 1 1 2 .               (21)
Assume the equilibrium strategy for such a firm is 
π α α α j t j t t
I
t
T s x x ,
*
, = + + 1 2 3 .                                                                (22)
The instrument xt
I appears because it provides information to firms 
observing xt
T that is useful in assessing the expectations of firms that 
do not observe xt
T.
For the 1 – P fraction of adjusting firms who do not observe xt
T, 
expectations can be based only on private signals and the central 
bank’s instrument. Let h index these firms. In addition, these firms 
must forecast both the cost shock and the output gap. Hence, 
E s s x t
h
t j t t
I = + Γ Γ 11 12 , , and 
E x x x t
h
t j t t
I = + Γ Γ 21 22 , . 
The pricing decision of such a firm satisfies 













= − ( ) + − ( ) + ( )






Γ Γ 2 2xt
I ( ).
                                   (23)
Assume the equilibrium strategy for such a firm is 
π α α h t h t t
I s x ,
*
, = ′ + ′ 1 2 .                                                                           (24)
Given the strategies of equations (22) and (24), for firms that 
observe xt
T,












* = + + ( )+ − ( ) ′ + ′ ( ) 1 2 3 1 2 1 , 
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implying that




t j t t
I π
*
, = + − ( ) ′ 
 




1 1 1 2 2
1
1 1
2 2 1 2 3 1 + − ( ) ′ + 
 
 P a H Pa xt
T.
Substituting this expression into equation (21) yields 
π ω ω j t j t Pa P a H s Pa ,
*











+ − ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 + + − ( ) ′ 
 









1 2 1 2 3
P a x





ωβ β κ ωβ
ω
( ) + − ( ) + ( )
= − ( ) + − ( ) ′ 
 
 + −
x H s H x





















+ − ( ) + − ( ) ′ 
 

+ − ( )
H s





2 2 1 1
1
,
P Pa H P a H Pa H xt
T
1 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 + − ( ) ′ + 
 










Equating coefficients with those in equation (22), 
a Pa P a H H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 = − ( ) + − ( ) ′ 
 
 + − ( ) ω ωβ ;                                   (25)
a Pa P a 2 2 2 1 1 = − ( ) + − ( ) ′ 
 
 ω ; and                                                    (26)
a Pa H P a H Pa H 3 1 2 1 2 3 2 1 1 1 = − ( ) + − ( ) ′ + 
 
+ − ( ) + ( ) ω ωβ κ .            (27)
For firms that do not observe xt
T,














* = + + ( )+ − ( ) ′ + ′ ( ) 1 2 3 1 2 1 , 
implying that
E Pa P a s
Pa P a Pa
t
h
t h t π
*
, = + − ( ) ′ 
 

+ + − ( ) ′ +
1 11 1 11




Γ Γ + + − ( ) ′ 
 














t h t π
*
, = + − ( ) ′ + 
 

+ + − ( ) ′





Γ Γ Γ Γ 12 2 2 3 22 1 + + − ( ) ′ + 
 
 Pa P a Pa xt
I.
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Substituting this expression into equation (23) yields




t h t π ω
ω
*
, = − ( ) + − ( ) ′ + 
 

+ − ( )
1 1
1
1 11 1 11 3 21
1 1
Γ Γ Γ




+ − ( ) ′ + + 
 

+ − ( ) + ( )







Γ Γ ωβ κ , + + − ( ) + ( ) 1 11 12 ωβ Γ Γ s x h t t
I
, .
Equating coefficients with equation (24),
′ = − ( ) + − ( ) ′ + 
 
+ − ( ) + ( ) a Pa P a Pa 1 1 11 1 11 3 21 21 11 1 1 1 ω ωβ κ Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ ;   (28)









( ( ) + ( ) κΓ Γ 22 12 .
         (29)
Equations (25)–(27) and (28)–(29) can be solved jointly for α1, α2, 














1 2 3 1 2
) ) + − ( ) ′ 
 
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